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Review Essay 
Theory, Totality, Critique: 
The Limits of the Frankfurt School 
Philip Goldstein 
University of Delaware 
Douglas Kellner, Critical Theory, Marxism and Modernity. Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1989. 
Many scholars have studied the history and the philosophy of the Frankfurt 
School, but few of them have explained why it became so influential after WW II or 
why it remains so influential even today. In Critical Theory, Marxism, and Modernity, 
Douglas Kellner, who has published extensively on the Frankfurt School, suggests that 
the School's original and insightful theories explain its influence.' As he says, the 
Frankfurt School, especially its "analyses of the administered society, the culture 
industries, science and technology as domination and the consumer society, provides 
unique and powerful perspectives to conceptualize, explain and critique recent socio- 
economic developments" (182). 
To justify this claim, he examines the School's history, including its origins in 
Germany, its initial socio-historical program of research, its development of an 
interdisciplinary research program, its shift towards philosophical studies and cultural 
analyses, and its provocative accounts of consumer society and the culture industry. 
'He edited Karl Korsch: Revolutionary Theory (1977) and Post- 
modernism/Jameson/Critique (1989), coedited Critical Theory and Society: A 
Reader (1989), co-authored Camera Politica: The Politics and Ideology of 
Contemporary Hollywood Film (1988), and wrote Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of 
Marxism (1984), Jean Baudrillard: From Marxism to Postmodernism and Beyond 
(1989); and, finally, Critical Theory, Marxism and Modernity (1989). 
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While scholarly studies like Martin Jay's authoritative The Dialectical Imagination 
(1973) also detail the history and the theoretical development of the Frankfurt School, 
Kellner's work examines the theories of the School's second generation (including 
Jurgen Habermas, Albrecht Wellmer, Claus Offie, and Fredric Jameson) explains the 
School's accounts of postmodernism, presents forceful criticisms of the School's 
theories, and suggest a cogent, new socio-historical version of the theories. I will not 
discuss his perceptive readings of Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, or Habermas in 
much detail; rather, I will show that his history and his criticism of the School do not 
consistently support his claim that the School's theories remain relevant and valuable. 
Rather, the history and the criticism expose the limits of the School's theories, espe- 
cially its totalizing method and its autonomous theoretical ideals. 
To begin with, he adopts a radical, Marxist rhetoric, but his method remains the 
very traditional, hermeneutic stance in which the critic sets aside his or her biases in 
order to explain and to evaluate the cognitive or mimetic force of the writer's insights 
and outlook. In other words, Kellner assumes, like E. D. Hirsch, Jr., and other con- 
servatives, that the truth or falsity of the Institute's views has nothing to do with the 
critic's subjective evaluations of them but is entirely a matter of the views' mimetic 
force. 
This mimetic approach produces some unresolved contradictions. For example, 
on this mimetic basis Kellner defends the Institute's belief that radical scholars should 
divorce themselves from oppositional groups and devote themselves to their theorizing, 
yet he also complains that the Institute grew more and more withdrawn from practical 
politics. On the one hand, Kellner presents the School's withdrawal from practical 
politics as an original and insightful account of an objective situation. As he says, 
Critical Theory represents a stage in . .. which radical intellectuals were 
separated from revolutionary social movements.. . . The Institute theorists were 
among the first to describe this situation and to make explicit the problems for the 
Marxian theory of revolution when the working class was defeated or became 
integrated into capitalist societies. This remains one of the defining features 
of ... Critical Theory to this day. (50) 
Here he presents controversial claims like "the working class was defeated" or "radical 
intellectuals were separated from revolutionary social movements" as an objective, 
empirical "situation" which the Frankfurt School "was among the first to describe" 
and which counts as one of its "defining features." On the other hand, he repeatedly 
complains that the Institute's scholars withdrew from practical politics (84). Moreover, 
he faults Jiirgen Habermas and other, second generation theorists for preserving the 
School's distance from political movements. 
His analysis of what the Frankfurt School calls the culture industry reveals similar 
inconsistencies. To begin with, he argues that in the United States, to which the Frank- 
furt theorists immigrated in the late 1930s, their status as exiles gave them 
extraordinary insights into American consumer society and culture industry (121). In a 
laudatory manner, he points out that the Institute, which "contextualizes culture within 
social developments," is "among the first to apply the Marxian method of ideology 2




critique to the products of mass culture" (123). Moreover, he suggests that, since the 
School's exiled theorists were working in Hollywood and in Washington, the theorists 
were able "to see what they called the 'culture industries' as a central part of a new con- 
figuration of capitalist modernity." As exiles, the theorists experienced American 
consumer society and culture industry more sharply and more distinctly than Ameri- 
can scholars could. Indeed, Kellner says that in the 1940s these exiled theorists experi- 
enced many crucial, new developments in the 1940s-"the affluent society, the 
consumer society, conformity, the media, the administered society, science and tech- 
nology and domination" (105). 
The mimetic truth of this empirical observation and lived experience strongly 
justifies these views, yet Kellner goes on to criticize them. For example, he rejects the 
Frankfurt Schools' belief that, since working class and socialist movements do not pro- 
duce a rational or a just society, science, Marxism, rationality, and technology simply 
impose social domination (85-86). Contrary to Adomo and Horkheimer, who claim in 
Dialectic of Enlightenment that enlightenment rationality enables social domination to 
progress from the factory and the prison to the concentration camp (97-99), Kellner 
denies that all science and reason entail domination; as he puts it, the views of Hork- 
heimer and Adomo are too "undifferentiated" (99). Moreover, he complains that 
Adomo and Horkheimer construe the "culture industry" as administered, imposed 
forms of indoctrination and control (131) and neglect the oppositional moments of 
popular culture (142). Kellner argues that a "more multidimensional approach to mass 
culture" would allow "contradictory moments of desire and its displacement, articula- 
tion of hopes and their repression" (141). He even suggests that "the theory of 'one- 
dimensional society' or notions of an 'organized' or 'state' capitalism-which postu- 
late a situation that presupposes that capitalism has overcome its fundamental con- 
tradictions and can now manage or administer away its fundamental problems and 
conflicts-are deeply flawed" (203). However, these forceful criticisms of Adomo and 
Horkheimer contradict the School's account of the intellectual's activity: if the School 
justifies the theoretical critique of the isolated intellectual opposing the mindless con- 
formity of capitalist modernity, the School cannot justify as well the practical critique of 
the involved intellectual defending the hopes and the dreams of rebellious workers, 
minorites, women, and third-world groups. Kellner says that the School "is com- 
patible with a multiperspectival approach which allows a multiplicity of perspectives 
(Marxian, Freudian, Weberian, feminist, post-structuralist and so on) to articulate a 
complex, multidimensional reality" (231), yet terms like "multiperspectival" or 
"multidimensional" cannot dissolve contradictions. 
Rather, these terms show his unyielding commitment to the totalizing, Hegelian 
stance adopted by the Frankfurt School. Indeed, he justifies this stance on mimetic 
grounds, yet this justification, like the other mimetic justifications, generates 
unresolved contradictions. For example, he points out that in the 1930s manifesto 
"Traditional and Critical Theory," Max Horkheimer, newly appointed director of the 
Institute, defends a totalizing, Hegelian stance. Horkheimer complains that the spe- 
cialized sciences, which ignore their social determination, simply reproduce capitalist 
fragmentation. Similarly traditional philosophical theory is closely identified with 
existing institutional structures and ideals and does not recognize its social determina- 
tion either. By contrast, dynamic and historical, the totalizing thought of the Institute 3
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repudiates class consciousness and the communist party, accepts the determining role 
of the economy, and contextualizes ideas (45-47). 
In the traditional manner, Kellner assures us that social circumstances justify 
Horkheimer's defense of a totalizing appproach. He says that, since capitalism itself 
was a totalizing system that attempted to penetrate every area of life, "totalizing 
concepts were necessary to describe the functioning of the capitalist system itself" 
(54). As he adds, 
[A 1gainst recent critiques of totalizing thought I would argue that the Institute's 
use of totalizing categories was justified in the face of a society which, like its 
totalitarian counterparts in Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, was itself 
attempting to control more and more aspects of life. (54-55) 
The critiques in question are undoubtedly those of the postmodernists, who oppose 
Kellner's description of modern society as well as the School's totalizing thought. 
Kellner rightly argues that, contrary to the postmodemists' expectations, modern 
society remains capitalist, yet that argument does not entitle him to describe capitalist 
society as though its nature and its power were self-evident and not contested or 
disputed. In Reading Capital, Althusser warns us not to read social experience as 
though its face betrayed theoretical solutions to theoretical solutions. Kellner's 
mimetic defense of totalizing thought commits this mistake. After all, a totalizing 
society can only support a totalizing approach if we already believe in totalizing 
practices. 
Moreover, Kellner goes on to repudiate the claim that capitalist society is 
totalizing. He points out that according to Habermas, Claus Offie, Albrecht Wellmer, 
and other second generation theorists, capitalism is "governed by a strange dialectic of 
irrationality and rationality, of organization and disorganization" (202). However, he 
does not examine what this new view says about his insistence that a totalizing society 
justifies a totalizing approach. If contemporary capitalist society is, as he says, "a 
peculiar combination of streamlined rationality and intense irrationality, of organiza- 
tion and disorganization," what sense does it make to say that capitalism's totalizing 
character justifies a totalizing approach? One might just as well claim that capitalism's 
fragmented or irrational character legitimatizes an irrational approach. Indeed, the 
fragmented character of capitalism may well support the postmodernist's construing 
knowledge as power and repudiating totalizing thought. 
My reader may complain that only positivist philosophers enjoy such logic- 
chopping criticisms. However, I mean to suggest that Kellner's mimetic approach 
ignores the differences between the School and the other Marxisms as well as other 
philosophical movements. Just as the "monolithic" USSR has broken into competing 
parties and groups, so too has twentieth century Marxism broken into diverse camps 
with opposed and contrary philosophies, methods, aims, and ideals. The classical 
Marxism of the nineteenth century remains influential, but the twentieth century has 
seen the emergence of historical, Hegelian, cultural, structuralist, and poststruc- 
turalist Marxisms as well. In the Soviet Union, the later or "mature" Georg Lukacs 
established an influential, historical approach, which led to impressive cultural studies 
by the East German scholar Robert Weimann, the eminent French scholar Lucien 4




Goldmann, and the distinguished British Marxist Raymond Williams. A Hegelian kind 
of Marxism emerged in France, where Sartre gave it an existential cast comparable to 
what the Frankfurt School of Social Theory produced; in Italy the imprisoned com- 
munist party leader Antonio Gramsci produced a theory of ideological hegemony 
elaborated by the eminent Raymond Williams, who initiated a new, influential "cul- 
tural materialism," and by Louis Althusser, who developed structuralist and, to an 
extent, poststructuralist kinds of Marxism. Anglo-American feminist scholars have 
also produced a poststructuralist Marxism engaged in extensive ideological critique. 
What is more, these Marxisms pursue very different goals. Historical Marxists expect 
socio-political change to produce an ideal, unified society, Hegelian Marxists defend a 
utopian realm of freedom and autonomy, and poststructuralist Marxists defend the 
dystopian condition of evolving disciplinary practices and loose, shifting political 
alliances. 
Kellner's emphasis on the Frankfurt School's theoretical originality and mimetic 
truth obscures these political and epistemological differences. For example, to justify 
the social psychology developed by Erich Fromm, he argues that after WW I the failure 
of German and European revolutions and the emergence of fascism made a social psy- 
chology a subject of great importance. He adds that classical Marxism did not have a 
social psychology that could explain such changes in conservative or radical con- 
sciousness (37); bilt he does not discuss Gramsci's influential theory of ideological 
hegemony. This theory, which elaborated the classical notion of a civil society, also 
accounted for these changes in consciousness; moreover, Gramsci also believed that 
the triumph of fascism and the failure of revolution made such a theory important. In 
addition, Kellner argues that in the 1930s the Institute carried out significant "ideology 
critiques of idealism, positivism, existentialism, philosophy of life and the emerging 
ideology of fascism, as well as of the ideological trends dominant in such disciplines as 
metaphysics and morality" (25). However, his account of these critiques assumes that 
all Marxists share a basic notion of ideology; actually, there are important differences 
between the Institute's "ideology critique" and that of the other Marxisms. To sum- 
marize briefly, classical Marxism assumes that the dominant ideas preserve the "objec- 
tive" interests of the ruling class; Hegelian theorists contend that dominant ideas and 
discourses preserve the mystified form of the commodity and erase the determining 
influence of the totality; structuralist and poststructuralist Marxists argue that myths, 
rituals, practices, symbols, or discourses explain how individuals experience and 
understand social relations. Moreover, while the classical and the Hegelian Marxists 
expect objective science or speculative theory to expose ideological distortion or false 
consciousness, poststructuralist Marxists grant that ideology may be partial or limited 
but deny that a scientific analysis makes ideology wrong or unnecessary. 
Lastly, Kellner lumps Gramsci and Lukacs together with the Institute's theorists 
on the dubious grounds that they were all sophisticates opposing the vulgar- 
repressive, rigid-orthodox or classical Marxists. As he says, 
Thus, while against the fossilized Marxism of the Second and Third Interna- 
tional, it made perfect sense to go back to Marx .. . , the retrieval of genuine 
Marxism has already taken place in such thinkers as Lukacs, Korsch, Gramsci 
and in Critical Theory. (218) 5
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Kellner does not mention Althusser, who divides the formal theory produced by 
intellectuals from the concrete practice ruled by ideological forces. This distinction, 
which lets party leaders go about their business and intellectuals go about theirs, 
opposes the destructive competition between "radical" intellectuals and "repressive" 
communist parties. 
Kellner also does not mention the work of Husserl and Heidegger, both of whom 
influenced Marcuse, Adomo, Horkheimer, and other original members of the School, 
yet the School does preserve certain tenets of a phenomenological outlook. Certainly 
its commitment to a totalizing practice restates the phenomenological belief that good 
theory examines what makes knowledge possible, not what makes it true or false. 
Moreover, the School shares the phenomenological belief that good theory defends 
autonomous norms and ideals. Why else would the Frankfurt School theorist present 
himself as a defender of all those values and norms which established institutions, if not 
the world's communist parties, deny? Kellner forcefully defends the continuing value of 
the School, but he does not go beyond this phenomenological faith in autonomous 
theory. However, to the extent that the School's disillusionment with capitalist and 
communist institutions justifies its faith in autonomous theoretical ideals, the emer- 
gence of liberal, reform minded communists in the USSR and African-American, third- 
world, and postmodemist critics in the United States may well mark the limit of the 
hegemonic Frankfurt School's totalizing approach. 6
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